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MEETING OF THE MINDS AND BODIES:  
 
CONTRACT LAW AND THE MUTUALITY OF 
SEXUAL EXCHANGES  
 
Kelly Jo Popkin* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
To win this silent consent is to make use of all the 
violence permitted in love. To read it in the eyes, to 
see it in the ways in spite of the mouth’s denial, that 
is the art of he who knows how to love. If he then 
completes his happiness, he is not brutal, he is 
decent. He does not insult chasteness; he respects it; 
he serves it. He leaves it the honor of still defending 
what it would have perhaps abandoned.1 
 
 - Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
 
 In an era characterized by pervasive consumerism and 
sexual freedom, consent is given and accepted by a wide variety of 
individuals in an expansive assortment of situations. Ubiquitous in 
many modern interactions, consent authorizes exchanges that would 
otherwise be considered legally impermissible, transforming 
                                                
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Harvard Law School, B.A., 2011, Harvard College.  
I am immensely grateful to Professor Diane Rosenfeld and Professor 
Catherine MacKinnon for their incredibly enlightening, life-changing classes 
on feminism and gender-based violence.  I would also like to thank my twin 
sister for her unwavering support and guidance. 
1  JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, POLITICS AND THE ARTS: LETTER TO M. 
D’ALEMBERT ON THE THEATRE 85 (Allan Bloom trans., Cornell Univ. Press 
1960). 
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slavery into employment, theft into contract, and rape into sex.2 
Consent to sex and consent to contract share many superficial 
qualities—both occur as a private agreement between two parties, 
but must pass the standards of public scrutiny in a court of law.3 It 
is assumed that both sexual and contractual agreements are 
“premised on voluntariness, mutually beneficial offer and 
acceptance, and a lack of coercion in the interaction.”4 Though the 
law has modernized in an effort to mitigate the imbalances of power 
inherent in contractual arrangements, it has failed to craft a meaning 
of consent that fully acknowledges the power imbalances inherent 
in heterosexual relationships.5 In contract law, common problems 
of nonviolent coercion in the negotiation stage of contract, voiding 
agreements and invalidating consent in cases of duress, 
unconscionability, misrepresentation, and other situations involving 
unjust bargaining are often expressly addressed. Rape law 
adjudications, in contrast, typically require an exhibition of physical 
coercion and resistance and “is indifferent to whether the sexual 
transactions in which assault is claimed occurred at (what contract 
law calls) arm’s length.” 6  Willfully blind to the nonphysical 
coercive elements present within the confines of the bedroom, 
American jurisprudence has established a damning precedent of 
damnum absque injuria7 for “many actions that most people would 
                                                
2 Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 171, 195 (2013). 
3 See James T. McHugh, Interpreting the "Sexual Contract" in Pennsylvania: 
The Motivations and Legacy of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Robert A. 
Berkowitz, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1677, 1677 (1997) (“The ‘contractual’ nature of 
sexual relationships is hardly a novel concept.”). 
4 Ann T. Spence, A Contract Reading of Rape Law: Redefining Force to 
Include Coercion, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 57, 72 (2003). 
5 Id. at 74 (“While sexual mores and freedoms have changed, the law has not 
kept pace with social transformations that require a greater inquiry into 
fairness and the abuse of power in private agreements.”). 
6 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 243 (Harv. U. 
Press 2005). 
7 Damnum absque injuria is a damage or injury suffered for which there is no 
recognizable harm in the legal sense. 4 SOUTH CAROLINA JURISPRUDENCE: 
ACTION § 18 (Charles E. Baker et al. eds., 2017) (“Where there has been no 
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regard as clear instances of sexual abuse, [but] are simply not 
illegal.”8  
With a narrow focus on only the most blatant forms of 
coercive behavior, rape law “may create over-inclusive social 
norms for sex” where nonphysical pressure and exploitative 
behavior is seen as “aggressive seduction” rather than forcible rape.9 
Part II of this Note explores the legal safeguards against coercion in 
contract law as a way to expose the oversights in rape law and 
suggest a new theoretical approach to sexual consent. Part III of this 
Note investigates the deficiencies in this theoretical approach by 
exploring the limitations of contract doctrines and exposing the 
patriarchal foundations of contractual bargaining. Part IV proposes 
the use of contract law in campus rape adjudications as a way to 
heighten the scrutiny of consent by viewing sexual encounters 
through the totality of the circumstances and an understanding of 
campus cultural coercion. Part V provides a normative assertion 
regarding women’s desire in a world of rape culture, and 
recommends a new model of consent that reifies rather than erases 
female sexuality.   
 
II.  PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINES AND THE CONTRACT OF 
CONSENT 
 
For if women consent to changes so as to increase 
the happiness of others rather than to increase our 
own happiness, then the ethic of consent, applied 
even-handedly, may indeed increase the amount of 
happiness in the world, but women will not be the 
beneficiaries.10 
 
                                                
violation of right, no recovery is permitted irrespective of the loss or damage 
the plaintiff sustained.”). 
8 Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of 
Domination, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1309, 1318 (1992). 
9 Spence, supra note 4, at 66. 
10  Robin West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A 
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 
149, 160-61 (2000). 
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 In keeping with the public policy of parens patriae,11 the law 
interferes with private dealings in an effort to correct abuses of 
powers among bargaining parties. Doctrines restricting freedom of 
contract between individuals, therefore, arise from the social 
contract inherent between state and citizen. Just as “unadulterated 
freedom of contract” can result in the exploitation of weaker parties, 
so too can unadulterated sexual freedom “authorize and approve the 
abuse of power in private agreements.” 12  The common law of 
contracts has placed healthy limitations on contracting as a way to 
preserve the conditions of mutuality inherent in bargaining between 
free and autonomous parties.13 These limitations can also apply to 
sexual consent as a way to ensure fairness and mutuality in all 
sexual encounters. The mirror-image rule, for example, requires an 
unequivocal acceptance of the precise terms of the agreement in 
question.14  Any deviation from those terms can be considered a 
counter-offer, which must be consented to anew.15 Consent to sex 
should be revocable at any time, just as contract offers are 
revocable. An invitation to bargain in a contract does not necessarily 
signify an expectation to be bound, just as an acceptance to a “date” 
or “fraternity party” should not signify an obligation to “put out.”16 
A “yes” to one sexual act should not indicate a “yes” to any 
                                                
11  Literally translated, parens patriae means "parent of the country," 
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 911 (3d ed.1969). A state can be granted 
parens patriae standing to sue on behalf of its citizens should the general 
wellbeing of its citizens be at stake. See Romualdo P. Eclavea, LL.B., LL.M., 
State's standing to sue on behalf of its citizens, 42 A.L.R. FED. 23 (1979). 
12 Spence, supra note 4, at 74. 
13 See Mo Zhang, Contractual Choice of Law in Contracts of Adhesion and 
Party Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 123, 133 (2008) (“Because of its 
importance in the course of contract making, a lack of mutuality may render 
a contract void.”). 
14 See S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 73 128 (Baker, Voorhis & 
Co., 1st ed. 1920). 
15 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (“A reply to 
an offer which purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror's assent 
to terms additional to or different from those offered is not an acceptance but 
is a counter-offer.”) See, e.g., Normile v. Miller, 326 N.E.2d 11 (1985). 
16 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
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subsequent sexual act, 17 and any new act must be renegotiated on 
fair and explicit terms.18  
  The conditions surrounding the exchange of consent to 
contract are crucial to analyzing the validity of an agreement. 
Though duress has traditionally centered on the presence of physical 
threats, the doctrine has “evolved to encompass more than mere 
physicality in recognition of the complexity of human interaction.”19 
The law has expanded to recognize nonviolent threats involving 
money, litigation, or any other “use of power for illegitimate 
ends.”20 Contractual duress accounts for the victim’s mental state in 
response to the threat,21 as opposed to criminal law’s emphasis on 
the mens rea of the accused in its determination of guilt.22 In so 
doing, criminal law demotes a survivor’s status to that of an 
aggrieved witness and “affirmatively reward[s] men with acquittals 
for not comprehending women’s point of view on sexual 
                                                
17 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(3) (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (“The 
fact that one or more terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain 
may show that a manifestation of intention is not intended to be understood 
as an offer or as an acceptance.”). 
18  For a model of consent that is exemplary of these ideals, see Stanford 
Administrative Guide 1.7.3: Prohibited Sexual Conduct: Sexual Misconduct, 
Sexual Assault, Stalking and Relationship Violence, 
https://adminguide.stanford.edu/chapter-1/subchapter-7/policy-1-7-
3#anchor-24465. 
19 Spence, supra note 4, at 79. 
20 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175-76 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
21 See 25 Am. Jur. 2d Duress and Undue Influence § 7 (“Duress is viewed 
with a subjective test which looks at the individual characteristics of the 
person allegedly influenced, and duress does not occur if the victim has a 
reasonable alternative to succumbing and fails to take advantage of it.”); see 
also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 (Am. Law Inst. 1981); Putz v. 
Allie, 785 N.E.2d 577 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Gott v. First Midwest Bank of 
Dexter, 963 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 
469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).   
22 Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or Consciousness 
of the Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21 (2001) (describing the various 
mens rea requirements of state penal codes and the Model Penal Code). 
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encounters.”23 Rape is thus considered a “cognizable injury from the 
viewpoint of the reasonable rapist. . . .”24 
Similar to duress in their purported aims, the doctrines of 
unconscionability and undue influence void agreements made 
between parties of widely disparate bargaining power, where an 
individual or group with greater sophistication, power, and/or 
resources intentionally misleads a weaker party lacking alternative 
recourse to the contract.25 As applied to rape law, the doctrine of 
unconscionability may aid a factfinder in “determin[ing] whether 
the coercive behavior was accompanied by a criminal mental state, 
i.e., whether the alleged rapist intended to coerce the victim.”26 As 
a legal theory, statutory rape recognizes the prevalence of emotional 
and psychological coercion in sex, yet draws a hard line on this 
doctrinal application by explicitly naming the sorts of relationships 
that would cause such an inducement (e.g. sex with minors, patients, 
etc.). 27  Though statutory rape laws protect weaker parties from 
coercion in such enumerated circumstances, rape law  largely 
provides a carte blanche for relationships that do not fit into these 
statutes’ narrow purviews. 28  Contract law, by contrast, defines 
                                                
23 Id., see Nancy Chi Cantalupa, Title IX’s Civil Rights Approach and the 
Criminal Justice System: Enabling Separate but Coordinated Parallel 
Proceedings, in THE CRISIS OF CAMPUS SEXUAL VIOLENCE: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON PREVENTION AND RESPONSE 125 (Sara Carrigan Wooten 
and Roland W. Mitchell eds., 2016). 
24  Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: 
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 654 (1983). 
25 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 177 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
26 Spence, supra note 4, at 88. 
27 See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 213.3. 
28 While rape prosecutions generally require a showing of force or lack of 
consent, the majority of jurisdictions presume that a minor is incapable of 
consenting to sexual activity. See Catherine L. Carpenter, The 
Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 
B.U. L. REV. 295, 309 (2006). (“[S]tatutory rape is unlawful sexual 
intercourse with a person under a specified age, who, because of that age, is 
presumed incapable of consenting to the sexual activity. Unlike rape, where 
the primary focus is on sexual intercourse accomplished against the will of 
the victim, the crime of statutory rape is premised on a different rationale. . . 
. the sexual activity is conclusively presumed unlawful because the underage 
partner does not have the capacity to consent to such activity.”) (citations 
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coercion in a more open-ended fashion, with a more generalized 
focus on the dynamic between the two negotiating parties rather 
than minimum age or other specific attributes of one or more of the 
parties. 29  Undue influence, for example, is simply the “unfair 
persuasion of a party who is under the domination of the person 
exercising the persuasion.”30 The presence of unfair domination and 
submission would be general enough to void consent to many sexual 
encounters that currently fall within the damnum absque injuria of 
sexual assault. 
Perhaps the most egregious oversight in rape law also 
happens to be one of the most thoroughly regulated improper 
bargaining methods in contract law – namely, fraudulent 
inducement through misrepresentation. The common law voids 
contracts in cases where a guilty party misrepresents an assertion 
with the intention to mislead the unknowing party into signing a 
contract.31 The guilty party need not even be fully certain of the 
assertion’s falsity, so long as it is material to the inducement and 
                                                
omitted). See also Joshua Mark Fried, Forcing the Issue: An Analysis of the 
Various Standards of Forcible Compulsion in Rape, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1277 
(1996) (“[E]ven though most states have statutorily abolished the resistance 
requirement, many courts still expect a victim to demonstrate passive 
resistance when confronted with a sexual assault.”). 
29 See, generally e.g. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123 
(Ct. App. 1966) (holding that school board had unduly influenced a teacher 
in requesting him to sign a resignation contract after he had gone 40 hours 
without sleeping after a false arrest and unfounded accusations of criminal 
homosexual activity); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S. 2d 264 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding that the sale of a freezer valued at $300 to individuals 
on welfare for over $1,000 is unconscionable); Totem Marine Tug & Barge, 
Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 584 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1978) (holding that 
construction company accepted much lower payment for services rendered 
due to their impending bankruptcy). 
30 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 177 (Am. Law Inst. 1981)(emphasis 
added). 
31 See e.g. Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that 
deliberate obfuscation of termite infestation rendered sale of house void); 
Duick v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 514, 519 (Cal. 
App. Dep’t Super Ct. 2011)(holding that the terms and conditions of an 
interactive web page did not adequately inform user that she would be subject 
to an internet prank). 
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conveyed with confidence. 32  Fraudulent inducement of sex, by 
contrast, is considered an acceptable technique of seduction. 33 
Monetary transactions receive greater protections than sexual 
exchanges because our body of jurisprudence prioritizes monetary 
loss among businessmen over a woman’s loss of bodily integrity.34 
Because bodily property is a right “that is fundamental to American 
citizenship,” 35  of arguably greater importance than the right to 
contract, one can only assume that a woman’s sexual integrity does 
not fall within the ambit of Locke’s famous formation: “every Man 
has a Property in his own Person.”36 
 
III.  THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IS GENDER NEUTRAL 
 
“If men are to be the masters of families they must 
have sexual access to women’s bodies, but the access 
cannot be a matter of mutual agreement because 
women’s and men’s bodies do not have the same 
political meaning.”37  
 
 On the surface, the aforementioned principles seem to be 
tools applicable to a legal analysis of sexual consent. However, an 
examination of the etiology of contract law exposes the limitations 
of its doctrinal applications. Freedom of contract is guaranteed by 
the Contracts Clause of the Constitution38 and reflects the United 
States’ laissez-faire approach to private economic dealings.39 The 
exchange of property is safeguarded by the due process clause40 and 
                                                
32 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162 (1)(b) (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
33 Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1120 (1986). 
34 Id. at 1121. 
35 Alexandra Wald, What’s Rightfully Ours: Toward a Property Theory of 
Rape, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 459, 474 (1997). 
36 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 27 (1690). 
37 CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 100 (1988). 
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
39 See, e.g., Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400 
(1983). 
40 See Knapp v. Smethurst, 779 A.2d 970, 985 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) 
(asserting the existence of both substantive and procedural due process claims 
premised on the deprivation of a property interest). 
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the exchange of personal services is similarly protected under the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude. 41 
Freedom of contract is a negative liberty, providing individuals with 
the freedom from governmental deprivation of the rights of life, 
liberty and property. 42 As a concept, freedom of contract assumes 
at its nexus that all individuals enjoy remotely comparable levels of 
autonomy and should therefore bargain freely without draconian 
governmental intervention. In short, it assumes that all people are 
seen as individuals in the eyes of the law, rather than as property or 
as living extensions of their male counterparts. To maintain this 
semblance of personal liberty and equality within the public sphere, 
each individual party to a contract must in turn recognize the other 
as an autonomous property owner, because “[w]ithout this 
recognition others will appear to the individual as mere (potential) 
property, not owners of property.”43 
 This critical assumption is informed by social contract 
theory writ large, with equality rooted in the inalienable natural 
rights inherent in all persons. Every man is “absolute lord of his own 
person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no 
body.”44 To ensure and preserve these rights with certitude, “the 
inhabitants of the state of nature exchange the insecurities of natural 
freedom for equal, civil freedom which is protected by the state.”45 
Individuals submit to the state in the original contract, relinquishing 
some freedom so as not to unduly trammel on the freedom of others. 
The political fiction of universal freedom establishes societal 
submission to state domination, while concurrently assuring 
                                                
41 Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Application of Section 1 of 13th Amendment 
to United States Constitution, U.S. Const. Amend. XIII, § 1, Prohibiting 
Slavery and Involuntary Servitude -- Labor Required by Law or Force Not as 
Punishment for Crime, 88 A.L.R.6th 203, 15 (2013) (“[A]ny effort by the 
employer to force the employee to remain in the employer's service and work 
out the balance claimed to be due after the time when the employee may 
legally terminate employment constitutes involuntary servitude in violation 
of Section 1 of the 13th Amendment.”). 
42  See generally THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. 
Buckley ed., 1999). 
43 PATEMAN, supra note 37, at 56. 
44 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 123 (1690). 
45 PATEMAN, supra note 37, at 2. 
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individual autonomy and equality. The social contract inculcates the 
sense of personal liberty necessary to preserve actual contractual 
relations, which so often involve “an exchange of obedience for 
protection”—the “civil mastery” and “civil subordination” between 
two unequal parties.46  
As Carole Pateman catalogues in The Sexual Contract, 
earlier contractarians carved women out of the social contract by 
“insist[ing] that men’s rights over women has a natural basis.” 
Contract theorists naturalize the subjection of women in society 
because it would otherwise jeopardize the political fiction of 
universal freedom and individual autonomy necessary to sustain the 
original contract. Contemporary contractarians no longer assert 
man’s natural dominance, and instead “subsume feminine beings 
under the apparently universal, sexually neuter category of 
‘individual.’47 If women were truly seen as individuals, however, 
then the freedom of contract enjoyed in the public sphere would be 
“extended into the private sphere, [and] inequalities of status 
between men and women. . . [would] disappear.” 48  The natural 
sexual contract of domination and subordination between man and 
woman is not based on equality and autonomy, yet this sexual 
contract is nonetheless rendered legitimate because it exists within 
the private sphere. The fictitious “individual” of modern-day 
contract is merely a man in gender-neutral clothing, and women are 
forced to either conform to the standards of bargaining on the 
androcentric terms of the public sphere or else attempt to remove 
themselves from public life entirely.49 The insidiously patriarchal 
bargaining practices of gender-neutral consumerism are 
unavoidable, however, affecting the product design and cost of 
anything from razors to antidepressants.50  
                                                
46 PATEMAN, supra note 37, at 7. 
47 PATEMAN, supra note 37, at 42. 
48 PATEMAN, supra note 37, at 167. 
49 See generally, JEAN BETHKE ELSTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: 
WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, (1981). 
50 NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, FROM CRADLE TO 
CANE: THE COST OF BEING A FEMALE CONSUMER (2015), 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/partners/Study-of-Gender-
Pricing-in-NYC.pdf;  INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE (US) COMMITTEE ON 
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 Pateman describes the sexual contract as the dark and often 
unacknowledged underbelly of the original contract. In contracting 
together to establish a new social order, men rebelled against the 
feudal power structures rooted in paternal birthright. With all men 
on equal ground, they establish a “civil fraternity,” binding them 
together in a sexual contract which ensures both “men’s political 
rights over women” and “orderly access by men to women’s 
bodies.” 51  The “fraternal patriarchy” enables men to otherwise 
indulge in the self-driven values of equality and liberty without 
risking the disunity that would result from a more competitive 
sexual environment.52 The social contract thus relies completely on 
the cohesive and coordinated front of male domination stemming 
from the sexual contract. With the rallying cry of “Liberty, Equality 
and Fraternity” women are barred from the public family of 
brothers and relegated to the natural family of the home, privatized 
and shielded from state intervention.53 If they do desire recognition 
in the public sphere, women “must acknowledge the political fiction 
and speak the language even as the terms of the original pact 
exclude them from the fraternal conversation.”54  They are faced 
                                                
WOMEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH, WOMEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH: PROGRESS, 
PITFALLS, AND PROMISE (2010), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK210136/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK2101
36.pdf.; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE (US) COMMITTEE ON WOMEN'S HEALTH 
RESEARCH, WOMEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH: PROGRESS, PITFALLS, AND 
PROMISE (2010), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK210136/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK2101
36.pdf. (“Women make up just over half the US population and should not be 
considered a special, minority population, but rather an equal gender whose 
health needs require equal research efforts as those for men.”);  Londa 
Schiebinger, Women’s Health and Clinical Trials, 112 J. CLINICAL 
INVESTIGATION 973, 975 (2003); but see Marianne N. Prout & Susan S. Fish, 
Participation of Women in Clinical Trials of Drug Therapies: A Context for 
the Controversies, MEDSCAPE,  
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/408956_2  (last visited Mar. 13, 
2017). 
51 PATEMAN, supra note 37, at 2. 
52 Stefani Engelstein, Civic Attachments & Sibling Attractions: The Shadow 
of Fraternity, GOETHE YEARBOOK, 18, at 205, 206 (2011). 
53 Id. at 207. 
54 PATEMAN, supra note 37, at 221. 
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with the impossible task of overcoming their subordinate status, yet 
the gender-neutral language of contract theory requires women to 
“become replicas of men.”55 
 Gender-neutralized free bargaining forms the backbone of 
the fraternal patriarchy. Paradoxically, this backbone is reinforced 
by aspects of contract doctrine that would appear to protect women 
from unfair dealings. At first blush, doctrines such as duress and 
unconscionability seem to be products of state paternalism. 56 
Indeed, the values behind these doctrines jeopardize the laissez-
faire treatment of contract because they call into question the nature 
of consent, and, by extension, the presumptions of individual liberty 
and autonomy that sustain the social contract. Though scholars have 
actively criticized these doctrines as symbols of the death of the 
freedom of contract, 57  courts will only apply them in “rare and 
extreme cases.” 58  These doctrines therefore uphold a guise of 
fairness and justice, while ignoring the many cases where 
consenting adults contracted in less than fair circumstances. In spite 
of these doctrines, which have social welfare at their root, contract 
law does not stray far from what critical legal scholars named the 
“exchange theory of value,” videlicet, “if the contract was ‘free’ 
then all parties must, by definition, have gained.”59 
 Duress, for example, requires a finding of a threat that 
“leaves the victim with no alternative,” i.e., an objective analysis of 
one’s feasible options rather than a subjective analysis of the 
specific party’s actual willingness to form the contract. 60  The 
objective test for duress assumes “the moral premise that a person 
should be bound only by contracts he took upon himself willingly,” 
but then falls short of its purported aims by also assuming that all 
individuals are acting on the basis of his or her own free will.61 
                                                
55 PATEMAN, supra note 37, at 188. 
56 Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 
763 (1983). 
57 Gan, supra note 2, at 182. 
58 See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K. Collins 
ed., Ohio State Univ. Press 2d ed. 1995). 
59 ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 152 (1997). 
60 Gan, supra note 2, at 181. 
61 Gan, supra note 2, at 182. 
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Contract law relies on the purported fairness of objectivity and the 
universality of individualism, whitewashing, and neutering all 
potential bargainers with the stroke of a very broad brush. With the 
exchange theory of value, there is, “no loser in a market economy, 
where one invariably consents to only what one wants and one only 
wants what will benefit one.” 62  This assumption is particularly 
problematic and counterproductive when applied to consent in a 
sexual context, because “the injury in rape lies in the meaning of 
the act to its victims, but the standard for its criminality lies in the 
meaning of the same act to the assailants.”63 Although “few women 
are in a position to refuse unwanted sexual initiatives,” the 
contractual ethics of consent translates an act of capitulation into an 
enthusiastic mutual exchange.64  Furthermore, the threats deemed 
serious enough to warrant a finding of duress are typically physical 
or economic in nature, rather than sexual or emotional. If a 
reasonable man is unlikely to sustain the injury, then the threat of 
such an injury is rendered illegitimate.65 Accordingly, the objective 
analysis of duress is yet another example of modern-day contract 
law’s sham of gender neutrality. As MacKinnon affirms, “[w]hose 
subjectivity becomes the objectivity of ‘what happened’ is a matter 
of social meaning, that is, it has been a matter of sexual politics.”66  
Paternalistic contract doctrines fail not only on a subjective 
level, but also on a macro level, in failing to take into account the 
societal pressures of gender expectations and other issues stemming 
from systemic hetero-patriarchal oppression. The doctrine of 
unconscionability, for example, measures disparities in bargaining 
power through the calculus of formal rather than substantive 
equality, assuming equality across gender, race, and socioeconomic 
                                                
62 WEST, supra note 58, at 10. 
63 MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 652. 
64 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An 
Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS, 515, 532 (1982) (“Given a system of consensual 
ethics, consensual sexual harms (like consensual market harms) simply 
disappear, or are rendered oxymoronic, where “consent” is in essence the 
source of value.”). 
65 Gan, supra note 2, at 192. 
66 MacKinnon, supra note 24, at 654. 
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lines and accounting for power imbalances in only the most 
egregious of cases.67 
 
IV.  CASE STUDY: CAMPUS RAPE ADJUDICATIONS  
 
“Perhaps it is time to challenge the public system 
that places self-interested autonomy at its heart and 
makes consent a key indicator of when that 
autonomy has been invaded.”68 
 
The question remains whether doctrines of duress, 
unconscionability, and other restrictions to freedom of contract can 
be expanded to acknowledge the unequal bargaining power between 
men and women and the socially-enforced imbalances inherent in 
all exchanges. The problem may lie in the foundational values of 
autonomy and self-interest of the social contract, from which all 
other contracts stem. Though it is impossible to change the history 
of contract law’s patriarchal roots, it may be possible to craft an 
“enlightened contract law” that is mindful of its own historicity. 
Enlightened contract law can expand the protections already 
provided against undue influence, duress, unconscionability, and 
misrepresentation by indoctrinating an understanding of the 
systemic inequality within its legal system. The theory of sexual 
consent provides the perfect platform for this legal experiment. As 
previously described, sexual consent and contractual consent share 
many commonalities. 69  Because heterosexual consent implicates 
the complexities of gender-based societal pressures, the 
“enlightened” contract doctrines can be tested within a legal 
framework wherein the existence of systemic inequality is glaringly 
obvious.  
 Campus rape adjudications can be a starting point for this 
new experiment in public policy. Though institutions of higher 
learning are free to structure the nuances of their school codes and 
                                                
67 Gan, supra note 2, at 196; Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 
A.2d 914 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
68 Jane Harris Aiken, Intimate Violence and the Problem of Consent, 48 S.C. 
L. REV. 615, 639 (1997). 
69 See, Section I, supra. 
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policies, they must remain in compliance with Title IX in order to 
retain governmental funding.70 Enacted under Congress’s Spending 
Clause, Title IX is essentially a contract with the government 
wherein schools are provided with yearly funding in assurance of 
equal access to education for all students.71 As a contract, Title IX 
“positions schools as partners of OCR [the Office of Civil Rights] 
in the enforcement of Title IX and not merely entities controlled by 
OCR.” Part of this enforcement entails adequate investigation and 
response to sexual assault, rape, and other instances of gender-based 
violence on campus.72 In promulgating policies of sexual consent, 
universities may be informed by the principles of “enlightened” 
contract doctrine, which would use the doctrines associated with 
unfair bargaining to analyze the existence of power imbalances in 
sexual encounters on campus. For example, campus adjudicators 
can weigh evidence of consent (or lack thereof) against 
circumstantial evidence such as age, access to social settings, the 
use of alcohol, and other forms of coercive pressure. It is undeniable 
that a first semester freshman woman has fewer friends, access to 
resources, and life experience than other students on campus. 73 
                                                
70 See, e.g. Dear Colleague Letter, D.O.E. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS,  
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf 
(Mar. 26, 2017) (“Title IX does not require a recipient to adopt a policy 
specifically prohibiting sexual harassment or sexual violence. . . .however, a 
recipient’s general policy…would violate Title IX if, because of the lack of a 
specific policy, students are unaware of what kind of conduct constitutes 
sexual harassment. . . .”). 
71 See e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. Of Educ. 125 S. Ct 1497, 1508-1509 
(2005) (“When Congress enacts legislation under its spending power, that 
legislation is “in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States 
agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”). See also Schaer v. 
Brandeis Univ., 735 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 2000); Pennhurst State Sch. and 
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
72  Amy Chmielewski, Defending the Preponderance of the Evidence 
Standard in College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143, 
153 (2013). 
73 The period between fall semester and Thanksgiving, known as the “red 
zone”, are when freshman women are most at risk for sexual assault. See The 
Red Zone, WEST VIRGINIA STUDENTS’ CENTER OF HEALTH, 
https://well.wvu.edu/articles/the_red_zone (Apr. 26, 2017) (“[T]here are 
more sexual assaults on U.S. college campuses during this time than at any 
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Hypothetically, if she brings a case against the quarterback of the 
football team or a member of a fraternity, campus adjudicators 
should weigh the accused’s testimony against the evidence of a 
coercive environment, in light of the totality of the circumstances.74 
Because Title IX provides civil remedies rather than criminal 
penalties, the standards of contract law can be used to analyze 
consent without jeopardizing the due process rights of the 
respondent. The burden of proof may weigh more heavily on the 
respondent. However, the punitive measures resulting from campus 
adjudications (an expulsion at worst) pale in comparison to a 
conviction of rape in a criminal proceeding.  
As a proceeding involving civil rights and civil remedies, 
campus adjudications can use the legal theories surrounding unfair 
bargaining as a way to protect weaker parties in sexual exchanges.75 
Rather than adhering to criminal law’s rebuttable presumption that 
a defendant is innocent until proven guilty, these civil adjudications 
can assume the natural power imbalances in all sexual exchanges as 
                                                
other time during the school year. Freshmen women are especially vulnerable 
to sexual assault during this time.”) 
74 The National Bureau of Economic Research released a report in December 
2015 detailing the links between party culture, football, and rape. For a 
summary of their findings. See Maxwell Strachan,  
Reported Rapes Go Through The Roof On Game Day At Big Football 
Schools, HUFFINGTON POST,  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/college-football 
rape_5685a429e4b014efe0da7ae0?utm_hp_ref=college (Jan. 1, 2016) 
(“Reports of college-aged offenders raping college-aged victims rise by 58 
percent on the day of home football games. . . Rapes reported by victims ages 
17-24 increase by 28 percent on days when there are football games at 
Football Bowl Subdivision schools.”). 
75 For example, campus adjudicators can engage in relevant fact-finding to 
determine whether a group of senior fraternity brothers asserted undue 
influence on a freshman woman. Factfinders can gather evidence that the frat 
member used their place of power and privilege to persuade the victim into a 
back room of a party, where she felt threatened into performing unwanted 
sexual activity.  Or a campus adjudication can find duress in a case where a 
woman willingly engages in foreplay with a partner, yet feels compelled to 
consent to sex after he threatens her. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 13.10 (Am. Law Inst. 1981); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
13.9 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) 
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a constant factor to be considered as part of the totality of 
circumstances surrounding an accusation of rape. In recognizing the 
inherently unconscionable nature of such exchanges, campus 
adjudicators can establish a rebuttable presumption of non-consent 
on behalf of the complainant and undue influence on behalf of the 
accused.76  
 
V. THE PROBLEM OF COMMODIFICATION 
 
“Sex itself is not liberating for women. Neither is 
more sex . . .The question is, what sexuality shall 
women be liberated to enjoy?”77 
 
 While these doctrinal applications may generate a more 
robust understanding of the complexities of sexual consent, the 
market terminology and consumerist rhetoric inherent within these 
theories draw problematic parallels between desire and monetary 
exchange. When consent to sex is analyzed using the same terms of 
art as assent to contract, jurisprudence may tacitly approve of the 
commodification of women’s bodies. This essentially leads to the 
harmful yet common notion that women provide their bodily 
integrity for men’s sexual gratification in exchange for money, 
                                                
76  Rebuttable presumptions are controversial in a criminal law context 
because it reverses the presumption of innocence long ingrained within our 
criminal justice system. Rebuttable presumptions do exist in the criminal law 
of other countries, however, and can serve as a model for campus sexual 
assault adjudication policies. See, e.g. Sexual Offenses Act, 2003, c. 42, § 75 
(Eng.): “[T]he complainant is to be taken not to have consented to the relevant 
act unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he 
consented, and the defendant is to be taken not to have reasonably believed 
that the complainant consented unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise 
an issue as to whether he reasonably believed it.” 
Establishing a rebuttable presumption of guilt in campus adjudications should 
not affect the presumptive protections of criminal rape proceedings because 
they occur within a civil rights, rather than criminal, context.   
77  CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON 
LIFE AND LAW, 93-102, 95 (Harv. U. Press 1987) (quoting Susan Sontag). 
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power, protection, or anything aside from their own sexual desires.78 
Attaching contract doctrines to analyses of consent may assist in the 
erasure of female sexuality so long as sex is something done for men 
to women rather than for both parties. When sex is framed as an 
exchange of services for goods, rather than an interaction fueled by 
mutual desire, female passivity and male aggression are perpetuated 
and heterosexuality remains “the linchpin of gender inequality.”79  
MacKinnon defines a woman as “a being who identifies and 
is identified as one whose sexuality exists for someone else, who is 
socially male.”80 Without a working model of female desire, the 
contract of consent resembles a unilateral rather than bilateral 
contract. It is as if women are perpetual offerors, forced to accept 
the “male direction of sexual expression, as if male initiative itself 
were what we want, as if it were that which turns us on.”81 The 
sexual contract solidifies men’s access to women’s bodies, and 
inscribes the unilateral contract of sex onto the bodies of all women. 
Women are forced to tacitly offer up their bodies to men, who accept 
the offer through sexual performance.82  The offer of a unilateral 
contract cannot be revoked once performance begins, trapping 
women within an exchange they never necessarily desired.83 This 
metaphorical “offer” is made real when placed into context: only 
recently have states begun to recognize post-penetration rape and 
the revocation of consent.84  As “walking embodiments of men’s 
projected needs,” women are presumed to advertise their “offer” to 
                                                
78 Alexandra Wald, What’s Rightfully Ours: Toward a Property Theory of 
Rape, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 459, 484-86 (1997). 
79 MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 533. 
80 MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 533. 
81 MACKINNON, supra note 77, at 95. 
82 MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 534. 
83 See, e.g. Petterson v. Pattberg, 161 N.E. 428, 430 (N.Y. 1928); Cook v. 
Coldwell Banker, 967 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Mo. 1998). 
84 See Mary Huff, The "New" Withdrawal of Consent Standard in Maryland 
Rape Law: A Year After Baby v. State, 5 MOD. AM. 145 (2009); State v. Baby, 
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the world and, therefore, waiving the need for verbal 
communication by implying consent through their mere existence.  
 The premises behind the aforementioned doctrines of 
contract law can be expanded to provide protections from coercion 
for sex, but only so long as women can define their sexuality on 
their own terms. 85  Rape law adjudications focus on unwanted 
penetration, reifying the androcentric definition of intercourse 
rather than a female-driven concept of sexual injury.86 Just as men 
define rape, so too do they define what is not rape. Consequently, 
our society has “few metaphors for sexual desire and passion that 
are not also metaphors for violence, power, and irresponsibility.”87 
Aggressive seduction and passive capitulation are the sexual themes 
generated by these definitions: men are taught from an early age that 
should “automatically “know” when a woman is aroused and 
willing to become sexually involved [without] asking for 
permission or clarification.”88  
Without communication, sexual encounters are implied-in-
fact contracts inferred from the non-verbal conduct of the parties 
involved and informed by the extemporaneous circumstances of 
common sexual “scripts.” 89  Many women and men choose the 
familiarity of these standard forms over the discomforts of 
                                                
85 For evidence and analysis of various forms of female sexuality suppression, 
see generally, Roy F. Baumeister and Jean M. Twenge, Cultural Suppression 
of Female Sexuality, 6 REV. OF GEN. PSYCHOL. 166, 169 (2002). 
86 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Rape: On Coercion and Consent, TOWARD A 
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 171, 172 (Harv. U. Press 1989) (“[T]he 
crime of rape centers on penetration. The law to protect women’s sexuality 
fromforcible violation and expropriation defines that protection in male 
genital terms.”). 
87 Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 
“Just What Part of No Don’t You Understand?”, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 
55 (1993). 
88 MICHAEL A. MESSNER & MARK STEVENS, Scoring Without Consent, in 
OUT OF PLAY: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON GENDER AND SPORT 107, 118 (State 
University of New York Press 2007). 
89 For more on the theory of sexual scripts and rape law, see Kennedy, supra, 
note 8, at 1318. See also John H. Gagnon, The Explicit and Implicit Use of 
the Scripting Perspective in Sex Research, 1 ANNUAL REVIEW OF SEX 
RESEARCH 1, 143 (1990).  
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venturing into unknown territories, because with communication 
and intimacy comes the dangers of vulnerability and rejection.90 
There can be no consensus ad idem without an explicit 
understanding of what both parties expect and desire. 91  “As a 
culture, we may not know what healthy, non-dominant, pleasurable, 
caring and responsible sex would look and feel like any more than 
someone who has never known freedom from oppression would 
know what freedom looks and feels like.”92 So long as men continue 
to define how female sexuality should manifest, explicit and honest 
communication is a necessary step to ensure mutual assent to a 
sexual encounter. Tacit assumption of consent and presumption of 
desire likens sex to a contract of adhesion—with boilerplate 
language that appears nonnegotiable and inescapable for both men 
and women alike.93 
                                                
90 See N. Tatiana Masters et. al, Sexual scripts among young heterosexually 
active men and women: Continuity and change, in NIH PUBLIC ACCESS 1, 1, 
14 (2013) (Through interviews with young adults, authors found three 
common methods of interacting with sexual scripts. (1) Conforming, i.e., 
gender scripts for sexual behavior overlapped with tradition norms. (2) 
Exception-finding, where traditional sexual scripts are accepted, but 
participants allowed themselves to deviate from these norms on occasion. (3) 
Transforming, where participants made their own sexual scripts without 
regard to cultural sexual conformity.  The study found that “[c]hanging sexual 
scripts can potentially contribute to decreased gender inequity in the sexual 
realm and to increased opportunities for sexual satisfaction, safety, and 
wellbeing, particularly for women, but for men as well.”). 
91 See Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923) (An 
agreement “implied in fact” is “founded upon a meeting of minds, which, 
although not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from 
conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, 
their tacit understanding.”). 
92 See Henderson, supra note 87, at 55. 
93 See e.g., Fanning v. Fritz’s Pontiac-Cadillac-Buick, Inc., 472 S.E.2d 242, 
245 (S.C. 1996) (exemplifying unconscionability resulting from a contract of 
adhesion. These standardized contracts establish an “absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of one party due to one-sided contract provisions, together 
with terms which are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make 
them and no fair and honest person would accept them.”). I venture to argue, 
however, that the standardized sexual script of male domination and female 
submission is so toxic and pervasive as to be damaging for both men and 
women’s sexualities alike. See JACKSON KATZ, THE MACHO PARADOX: WHY 
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 The original social contract establishes the ideals of 
autonomy and self-reliance, perpetuated by the “good faith and fair 
dealings” of actual contracts within the free market. As a contract 
between the government and institutions of higher learning, Title IX 
establishes the ideals of gender equality and access to educational 
opportunities within a campus environment. Just as free market 
contracts embody the values envisioned by the original 
contractarians, so too must the contracts of sexual consent among 
students embody the values that Title IX legislation seeks to foster 
and preserve. Accordingly, consent between students should 
exemplify the intentions of Title IX at its core—the standards of 
gender equity, bodily integrity, and equal opportunity for all. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
The line between sex and rape is drawn by society and rules 
of society are run by men. The victim is any individual who can be 
overpowered, both symbolically and physically.  
 All aggressors share a common trait and that is one of power, 
whether established by their physical strength, age, authority, status, 
or any other attribute that may put them in a coercive position over 
another individual.  Age appears to be the only aspect of sexual 
assault adjudication that takes into account the coercive power 
dynamic between the rapist and his victim. When the victim is 
below the age of consent, it is understood that she cannot 
sufficiently and appropriately agree to sexual activity.  With Romeo 
and Juliet provisions, certain jurisdictions reveal the “equality” 
premise for these laws as less of a condemnation of underage sex, 
and more of an acknowledgment of a minor’s comparative financial, 
legal, intellectual, and social inequality as compared to an adult.  
Once women reach the age of consent in their jurisdiction, they are 
no longer afforded an equality analysis in the eyes of the court or 
society writ large.  Rather arbitrarily, women are somehow risen to 
the status of “consenting” adults, fully free, unencumbered, and 
                                                
SOME MEN HURT WOMEN AND HOW ALL MEN CAN HELP (3d ed., 
Sourcebooks, Inc. 2006).  
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sexually liberated to choose when they want to have sex and with 
whom.  
Unlike contract law, few sexual assault laws exist that 
protect each party from dangerously unequal bargaining power.  
Unlike consent to contract, consent to sex can be induced by fraud 
or duress without legal repercussions.  There need not be mutuality 
in the sexual exchange, or any nominal consideration for her 
acceptance.  Because the gender construction of heterosexual 
activity is centered around a man’s understanding of sex, he tends 
to define when the sex begins and inevitably when it ends from his 
own perspective. The court implies that violent, physical force and 
resistance are the only ways by which coercive sexual behavior can 
be considered criminal.  It appears that women are walking 
embodiments of “yes,” perpetually and tacitly offering their bodies 
to men unless they are loudly and violently resisted.  
As described, consent to sex is rarely questioned or 
invalidated in the face of inequality, in spite of the undeniable power 
imbalance in many, if not most, sexual activities.  Even in 
affirmative consent jurisdictions such as California, sexual assault 
laws fail to reflect the many ways in which an individual can be 
pressured into acquiescing to sex they do not want to have.  
Consensual does not imply sensual, and often implies compulsion.  
Sexual assault laws proffer a societal understanding of sexuality that 
ignores the substantive inequalities that establish the conditions 
within which rape has thrived.  In a true libertarian fashion, sex 
between two adults is considered a private agreement that 
individuals are free to pursue, accept, or decline.  Victims of 
coercive sexual behavior who nevertheless “consented” are seen to 
have consented as a colorless, genderless, and otherwise “universal” 
individual. They are understood to have consented irrespective of 
any characteristics that would have put them in a literal and 
figurative position beneath that of a heterosexual man. 
Political theorists such as Hobbes and Locke assert that 
members of society tacitly submit and subordinate themselves to the 
state in the form of the “social contract,” relinquishing some of their 
natural freedoms so as not to impinge on the freedoms of other men.  
Alternatively, as Carol Pateman suggests in The Sexual Contract, 
women were never privy to this original contract.  With the advent 
of formal equality, however, these historically subordinated classes 
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of individuals were forced to accept the androcentric social contract 
with its assumption that all individuals had the autonomy and 
privilege to assert themselves and interact on equal terms.  Sexual 
consent is an offshoot of the fallacious “free market” myth, and is 
merely used as a justification for tactics of coercion that fortify 
existing sexual political structures.  Without laws that recognize the 
lived realities of inequality, to provide consent will mean to concede 
to, rather than welcome, the sexual advances of another.   
Title IX campus sexual assault adjudications should 
supplement their consent analyses with a holistic understanding of 
gender inequality, notions of masculinity, and other macropolitical 
aspects that tend to manifest on communal, micropolitical, and 
individual levels.  In so doing, adjudicators can move past the 
assumption that “yes” always means “yes” even in an unequal 
world.  To ignore the existence of duress, fraud, undue influence, 
and other examples of coercion in a sexual exchange, rape law only 
further entrenches the social hierarchies that are established and 
perpetuated by sexual violence. 
 
